Threading a needle in foreign policy — finding a position that satisfies competing demands from different audiences — is one of the most difficult feats in government. Britain’s attempt to manage the Iran crisis by initially refusing, then cooperating on limited terms, was an effort at precisely this kind of calibration. The results were instructive.
The needle to be threaded was the gap between the American expectation of unconditional allied support and the domestic Labour expectation of non-involvement in military operations the party regarded as unwise or unjust. The two expectations were fundamentally incompatible, and the attempt to satisfy both simultaneously was probably doomed from the start.
The initial refusal satisfied the domestic audience — up to a point. Labour MPs were relieved that the government had not simply capitulated to American requests. The position appeared principled and independent. But the American reaction changed the calculus rapidly.
The subsequent reversal — limited, defensive, conditional — was an attempt to provide enough cooperation to repair the relationship without so much as to alienate the domestic critics. Neither group was fully satisfied. The Americans regarded the cooperation as insufficient; the Labour sceptics regarded it as unnecessary.
The president’s dismissal of Britain’s offer of further support, and his warning that the delay would be remembered, was the definitive verdict on the needle-threading exercise. It had not worked. The episode had produced the worst of both worlds — and the government was left to manage the fallout from a position of diminished credibility with both its ally and elements of its own party.